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Many social, economic and political activities are conducted by groups or coalitions of in-
dividuals. For example, consumption takes place within households or families; production
is carried out by ﬁrms which are large coalitions of owners of diﬀerent factors of produc-
tion; workers are organized in trade unions or professional associations; public goods are
produced within a complex coalition structure of federal, state, and local jurisdictions;
political life is conducted through political parties and interest groups; and individuals
belong to networks of formal and informal social clubs.
The formation of coalitions has been a major topic in game theory, and has beenstudied
mainly using the framework of cooperative games in coalitional form (see Aumann and
Drèze, 1974). Unfortunately, externalities among coalitions cannot be considered within
such framework (see Bloch, 1997). As a consequence, the formation of coalitions has been
described in the recent years as noncooperative simultaneous or sequential games, which
are usually solved using the Nash equilibrium concept or one of its reﬁnements. The most
disturbing feature of simultaneous coalition formation games is that the agents cannot
be farsighted in the sense that individual deviations cannot be countered by subsequent
deviations (see Hart and Kurz, 1983). In order to remedy this weakness sequential coalition
formation games have been proposed (see Bloch 1995 and 1996). Nevertheless, these
sequential games are quite sensitive to the exact coalition formation process and rely on
the commitment assumption. Once some agents have agreed to form a coalition they are
committed to remain in that coalition. They can neither leave the coalition nor propose
to change the coalition at subsequent stages.
Coalition formation games in eﬀectiveness form as in Chwe (1994) specify what each
coalition can do if and when it forms. This representation of games allows us to study
economic and social activities where the rules of the game are rather amorphous or the
procedures are rarely pinned down (e.g. in sequential bargaining or coalition formation
without a rigid protocol), and for which classical game theory could lead to a solution
which relies heavily on an arbitrarily chosen procedure or rule. For games in eﬀectiveness
form where coalitions can form through binding or non-binding agreements and actions are
public, Chwe (1994) has proposed an interesting solution concept, the largest consistent
set. This solution concept predicts whichcoalitions structures are possibly stable andcould
emerge. Chwe’s approach has a number of nice features. Firstly, it does not rely on a very
detailed description of the coalition formation process as noncooperative sequential games
do. No commitment assumption is imposed. Secondly, it incorporates the farsightedness
of the coalitions. A coalition considers the possibility that, once it acts, another coalition
might react, a third coalition might in turn react, and so on without limit.
1The largest consistent set suﬀers from a number of drawbacks, some of them pointed
out by Chwe himself. For instance, the largest consistent set may fail to satisfy the
requirement of individual rationality. An individual that is given the choice between two
moves, where one yields with certainty a higher payoﬀ than the other, might choose the
move leading to the lower payoﬀ according to the largest consistent set. This is perhaps
somewhat less disturbing than it seems at ﬁrst sight, since the largest consistent set aims
to be a weak concept, a concept that rules out with conﬁdence, but is not so good at
picking out. The largest consistent set may also include coalition structures from which
some coalition could deviate without the risk of ending worst oﬀ in subsequent deviations.
Precisely, a coalition structure may be stable because a deviation from it is deterred by
a likely subsequent deviation where the initial deviators are equal oﬀ. But it might be
that any other likely subsequent deviations would not make the initial deviators worst oﬀ
and at least one of them would make the initial deviators better oﬀ. Then, a coalition of
cautious players, who give positive weight to all likely subsequent deviations, will deviate
for sure from the original coalition structure. In this paper, we introduce cautiousness into
the deﬁnition of the largest consistent set, which leads to a reﬁnement called the largest
cautious consistent set.
Two diﬀerent notions of a coalitional deviation or move can be found in the game-
theoretic literature. Strict deviation: a group of players or a coalition can deviate only
if each of its members can be made better oﬀ. Weak deviation: a group of players or
a coalition can deviate only if at least one of its members is better oﬀ while all other
members are at least as well oﬀ. A weak deviation or move requires only one player to
be better oﬀ as long as all other members of the group are not worse oﬀ, whereas under
a strict deviation or move, all deviating players must be better oﬀ. We shall distinguish
between the indirect strict dominance relation and the indirect weak dominance relation in
the deﬁnition of the largest (cautious) consistent set. The indirect strict (weak) dominance
relation captures the fact that farsighted coalitions consider the end coalition structure
that their move(s) may lead to, and that only strict (weak) deviations or moves will be
engaged.
We ﬁnd that the largest (cautious) consistent set is sensitive to the exact deﬁnition of
the indirect dominance relation. In general there is no relationship between the largest
(cautious) consistent set based on the indirect strict dominance and the largest (cautious)
consistent set based on the indirect weak dominance. The largest consistent set is never
empty whenever the set of coalition structures is ﬁnite. Unfortunately, the largest cautious
consistent set might be empty in some situations.
However, we show that the largest cautious consistent set reﬁnes considerably the
2largest consistent set in coalition formation games satisfying the properties of positive
spillovers, negative association, individual free-riding incentives and eﬃciency of the grand
coalition. Positive spillovers restrict the analysis to games where the formation of a coali-
tion by other players increases the payoﬀ of a player. Negative association imposes that, in
any coalition structure, small coalitions have greater per-member payoﬀs than big coali-
tions. Individual free-riding incentives assume that a player becomes better oﬀ leaving
any coalition to be alone. An economic situation satisfying these properties is a cartel for-
mation game under Cournot competition. Public goods coalitions satisfy these properties
under some conditions.
Many coalition structures may belong to the largest consistent set in coalition forma-
tion games satisfying the four properties imposed on the payoﬀs. The grand coalition
always belongs to the largest consistent set. The stand-alone coalition structure (where
all players are singletons) is never stable under the largest consistent set based on the
indirect weak dominance relation. However, the largest cautious consistent set singles out
the grand coalition, which is the eﬃcient coalition structure.
The paper has been organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce some notations,
primitives and deﬁnitions of indirect dominance. We present the solution concepts of
Chwe (1994), and we propose a reﬁnement, the largest cautious consistent set. In Section
3 we use the above mentioned concepts to predict which coalition structures are stable in
coalition formation games with positive spillovers. In Section4 we analyze and characterize
the stable outcomes in the cartel formation game. We also introduce a congestion or
monitoring cost and we discuss the role of monitoring costs in the determination of largest
consistent sets. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Farsighted Coalitional Stability
The players are forming coalitions and inside each coalition formed the members share the
coalition gains from cooperation. Let P be the ﬁnite set of coalition structures. A coalition
structure P = {S1,S 2,...,Sm} is a partition of the player set N = {1,2,...,n}, Si ∩Sj = ∅
for i ￿= j and
￿m
i=1Si = N. Let |Si| be the cardinality of coalition Si. Gains from
cooperation are described by a valuation V which maps the set of coalition structures P
into vectors of payoﬀs in Rn. The component Vi(P) denotes the payoﬀ obtained by player
i if the coalition structure P is formed.
How does the coalition formation proceed? What coalitions can do if and when they
form is speciﬁed by {→S}S⊆N,S￿=∅, where {→S}, S ⊆ N,i sa neﬀectiveness relation on
P.F o ra n yP,P￿ ∈ P, P →S P￿ means that if the coalition structure P is the status-quo,
coalition S can make the coalition structure P￿ the new status-quo. After S deviates
3to P￿ from P, coalition S￿ might move to P￿￿ where P￿ →S￿ P￿￿, etc. All actions are
public. If a status-quo P is reached and no coalition decides to move from P,t h e nP
is a stable coalition structure. A coalition formation game in eﬀectiveness form G is
(N,P,V,{→S}S⊆N,S￿=∅).
2.1 Indirect Strict or Weak Dominance
As Konishi et al. (1999) mention, the game-theoretic literature uses two diﬀerent notions
of a coalitional deviation or move.
• Strict Deviation: A group of players or a coalition can deviate only if each of its
members can be made better oﬀ; and
• Weak Deviation: A group of players or a coalition can deviate only if at least one of
its members is better oﬀ while all other members are at least as well oﬀ.
A weak deviation or move requires only one player to be better oﬀ as long as all other
members of the group are not worse oﬀ, whereas under a strict deviation or move, all
deviating players must be better oﬀ. Hence, we shall distinguish between the indirect
strict dominance relation and the indirect weak dominance relation.
The indirect strict dominance relation captures the fact that farsighted coalitions con-
sider the end coalition structure that their move(s) may lead to, and that only strict
deviations or moves will be engaged. A coalition structure P￿ indirectly strictly dominates
P if P￿ can replace P in a sequence of moves, such that at each move all deviators are
better oﬀ at the end coalition structure P￿ compared to the status-quo they face. Formally,
indirect strict dominance is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 1 A coalition structure P is indirectly strictly dominated by P￿,o rP ￿ P￿,
if there exists a sequence P0,P1,...,Pm (where P0 = P and Pm = P￿) and a sequence
S0,S 1,...,Sm−1 such that Pj →Sj Pj+1, Vi(P￿) >V i(Pj) for all i ∈ Sj,f o rj =0 ,1,..,m−
1.
Direct strict dominance is obtained by setting m =1in Deﬁnition 1. A coalition
structure P is directly strictly dominated by P￿,o rP<P ￿, if there exists a coalition S
such that P →S P￿ and Vi(P￿) >V i(P) for all i ∈ S. Obviously, if P<P ￿,t h e nP ￿ P￿.
The deﬁnition of the indirect strict dominance relation ￿ is traditional: it is customary
to require that a coalition will deviate or move only if all of its members are made better
oﬀ at the end coalition structure, since changing the status-quo is costly, and players have
to be compensated for doing so.
4But sometimes some players may be indiﬀerent between the status-quo they face and a
possible end coalition structure, while others are better oﬀ at this end coalition structure.
Then, it should not be too diﬃcult for the players who are better oﬀ at this end coalition
structure to convince the indiﬀerent players to join them to move towards this end coalition
structure.1 The indirect weak dominance relation captures this idea. A coalition structure
P￿ indirectly weakly dominates P if P￿ can replace P in a sequence of moves, such that at
each move all deviators are at least as well oﬀ at the end coalition structure P￿ compared
to the status-quo they face, and at least one deviator is better oﬀ at P￿. Formally, indirect
weak dominance is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 2 A coalition structure P is indirectly weakly dominated by P￿,o rP ￿ P￿,
if there exists a sequence P0,P1,...,Pm (where P0 = P and Pm = P￿) and a sequence
S0,S 1,...,Sm−1 such that Pj →Sj Pj+1, Vi(P￿) ≥ Vi(Pj) for all i ∈ Sj, and Vi(P￿) >
Vi(Pj) for some i ∈ Sj,f o rj =0 ,1,..,m −1.
Direct weak dominance is obtained by setting m =1in Deﬁnition 2. A coalition
structure P is directly weakly dominated by P￿,o rP<P￿, if there exists a coalition S
such that P →S P￿, Vi(P￿) ≥ Vi(P) for all i ∈ S and Vi(P￿) >V i(P) for some i ∈ S.
Obviously, if P<P￿ then P ￿ P￿. Also, if P is indirectly strictly dominated by P￿,t h e n
P is indirectly weakly dominated by P￿. Of course the reverse is not true. To summarize,
we have
P<P ￿ ⇒ P<P￿ ⇒ P ￿ P￿
P<P ￿ ⇒ P ￿ P￿ ⇒ P ￿ P￿
2.2 The Largest Consistent Set
Based on the indirect strict dominance relation, the largest consistent set LCS (G,￿) due
to Chwe (1994) is deﬁned in an iterative way. Chwe (1994) has shown that there uniquely
exists a largest consistent set.
Deﬁnition 3 Let Y 0 ≡ P. Then, Y k (k =1 ,2,...) is inductively deﬁned as follows:
P ∈ Y k−1 belongs to Y k if and only if ∀ P￿,S such that P →S P￿, ∃ P￿￿ ∈ Y k−1,w h e r e
P￿ = P￿￿ or P￿ ￿ P￿￿, such that we do not have Vi(P) <V i(P￿￿) for all i ∈ S. The largest
consistent set LCS (G,￿) is
￿
k≥1Y k.
That is, a coalition structure P ∈ Y k−1 is stable (at step k) and belongs to Y k,i fa l l
possible deviations are deterred. Consider a deviation from P to P￿ by coalition S.T h e r e
1For instance, the weak dominance relation makes sense when very small transfers among the deviating
group of players are allowed.
5might be further deviations which end up at P￿￿, where P￿ ￿ P￿￿. There might not be any
further deviations, in which case the end coalition structure P￿￿ = P￿. In any case, the end
coalition structure P￿￿ should itself be stable (at step k−1), and so, should belong to Y k−1.
If some member of coalition S is worse oﬀ or equal oﬀ at P￿￿ compared to the original
coalition structure P, then the deviation is deterred. Since P is ﬁnite, there exists m ∈ N
such that Y k = Y k+1 for all k ≥ m,a n dY m is the largest consistent set LCS (G,￿).I f
a coalition structure is not in the largest consistent set, it cannot be stable. The largest
consistent set is the set of all coalition structures which can possibly be stable.
We deﬁne in a similar way the largest consistent set LCS (G,￿) based on the indirect
weak dominance relation. The proof of Chwe (1994) can be easily adapted to show that
there uniquely exists a largest consistent set LCS (G,￿).
Deﬁnition 4 Let Y 0 ≡ P. Then, Y k (k =1 ,2,...) is inductively deﬁned as follows:
P ∈ Y k−1 belongs to Y k if and only if ∀ P￿,S such that P →S P￿, ∃ P￿￿ ∈ Y k−1,w h e r e
P￿ = P￿￿ or P￿ ￿ P￿￿, such that we do not have Vi(P) ≤ Vi(P￿￿) for all i ∈ S and
Vi(P) <V i(P￿￿) for some i ∈ S. The largest consistent set LCS (G,￿) is
￿
k≥1Y k.
That is, a coalition structure P ∈ Y k−1 is stable (at step k) and belongs to Y k,i fa l l
possible deviations are deterred. Consider a deviation from P to P￿ by coalition S.T h e r e
might be further deviations which end up at P￿￿,w h e r eP￿ ￿ P￿￿. There might not be any
further deviations, in which case the end coalition structure P￿￿ = P￿. In any case, the
end coalition structure P￿￿ should itself be stable (at step k − 1), and so, should belong
to Y k−1. If some member of coalition S is worse oﬀ or all members of S are equal oﬀ at
P￿￿ compared to the original coalition structure P, then the deviation is deterred. Since
P is ﬁnite, there exists m ∈ N such that Y k = Y k+1 for all k ≥ m,a n dY m is the largest
consistent set LCS (G,￿).
The following example shows that the largest consistent set is sensitive to the exact
deﬁnition of the indirect dominance relation. Figure 1 depicts a three-player coalition
formation game in eﬀectiveness form, where only three coalition structures are feasible:
{12,3}, {1,2,3} and {1,23}. The payoﬀ vectors associated with those three partitions are
given in Figure 1 as well as the possible moves from each partition. For instance, player
1 can move from {12,3} where he gets 1 to {1,2,3} where he gets 2. We have {12,3} <
{1,2,3} (hence {12,3} < {1,2,3})a n d{1,2,3} < {1,23}. It follows that LCS (G,￿)=
{{1,2,3},{1,23}} and LCS (G,￿)={{12,3},{1,23}}. In general, these two indirect
dominance relations (weak or strict) might yield two very diﬀerent largest consistent sets.
6￿ ￿ ￿￿￿
{12,3}{ 1,2,3}{ 1,23}
(1,1,0) (2,0,0) (0,1,0) {1}{ 2,3}
F￿￿￿￿￿ 1. The largest consistent set is sensitive to the indirect dominance relation.
2.3 The Largest Cautious Consistent Set
Similarly to the rationalizability concepts,2 the largest consistent set does not determine
what will happen but what can possibly happen. The following example shows that the
largest consistent set is not consistent with cautiousness. Figure 2 depicts a three-player
coalition formation game in eﬀectiveness form, where the feasible coalition structures are:
{123}, {1,23}, {13,2} and {1,2,3}. The payoﬀ vectors associated with those partitions
are given in Figure 2 as well as the possible moves from each partition. For instance,
player 1 can move from {123} where he gets 1 to {1,23} where he gets 2. We have
{123} < {1,23}, {1,23} < {1,2,3}, {1,23} < {13,2} and {123}￿{ 13,2}. It follows
that LCS (G,￿)=LCS (G,￿)={{123}, {1,2,3}, {13,2}}. The coalition structure
{123} belongs to the largest consistent because the deviation to {1,23} is deterred by the
subsequent deviation to {1,2,3} where the original deviator is equal oﬀ. But player 1
cannot end worse oﬀ by engaging a move from {123} compared to what he gets in {123}.







(1,0,0) (2,0,0) (1,2,1) {1}{ 2}
{1,3}
F￿￿￿￿￿ 2. The largest consistent set is not consistent with cautiousness.
We propose toreﬁne the largestconsistent set by applying the spirit of some reﬁnements
of the rationalizability concept to the largest consistent set. It leads to the deﬁnition of the
largest cautious consistent set derived from either the indirect strict dominance relation
2See Bernheim (1984), Herings and Vannetelbosch (1999), Pearce (1984).
7or the indirect weak dominance relation. Formally, the largest cautious consistent set
LCCS (G,￿) based on the indirect strict dominance is deﬁned in an iterative way.
Deﬁnition 5 Let Z0 ≡ P. Then, Zk (k =1 ,2,...) is inductively deﬁned as follows:
P ∈ Zk−1 belongs to Zk if and only if ∀ P￿,Ssuch that P →S P￿, ∃ α =( α(P1),...,α(Pm))
satisfying
￿m
j=1 α(Pj)=1 , α(Pj) ∈ (0,1), that gives only positive weight to each Pj ∈





α(Pj)· Vi(Pj) for all i ∈ S.
The largest cautious consistent set LCCS (G,￿) is
￿
k≥1Zk.
The idea behind the largest cautious consistent set LCCS(G,￿) is that once a coali-
tion S deviates from P to P￿, this coalition S should contemplate the possibility to endwith
positive probability at any coalition structure P￿￿ not ruled out3 and such that P￿ = P￿￿
or P￿ ￿ P￿￿. Hence, a coalition structure P is never stable if a coalition S can engage a
deviation from P to P￿ and by doing so there is no risk that some coalition members will
end worse oﬀ or equal oﬀ.
The deﬁnition, based on the indirect weak dominance, of the largest cautious consistent
set LCCS (G,￿) is as follows.
Deﬁnition 6 Let Z0 ≡ P. Then, Zk (k =1 ,2,...) is inductively deﬁned as follows:
P ∈ Zk−1 belongs to Zk if and only if ∀ P￿,Ssuch that P →S P￿, ∃ α =( α(P1),...,α(Pm))
satisfying
￿m
j=1 α(Pj)=1 , α(Pj) ∈ (0,1), that gives only positive weight to each Pj ∈


















α(Pj) · Vi(Pj) for some i ∈ S.
The largest cautious consistent set LCCS (G,￿) is
￿
k≥1Zk.
Once a coalition S deviates from P to P￿, this coalition S should contemplate the
possibility to end with positive probability at any coalition structure P￿￿ not ruled out
3On the contrary, in the largest consistent set once a coalition S deviates from P to P
￿, this coalition
S only contemplates the possibility to end with probability one at a coalition structure P
￿￿ not ruled out





8and such that P￿ = P￿￿ or P￿ ￿ P￿￿. Hence, a coalition structure P is never stable if a
coalition S can engage a deviation from P to P￿ and doing so some coalition members will
be better oﬀ but there is no risk that some coalition members will end worse oﬀ.
Obviously, the largest cautious consistent set is a reﬁnement of the largest consistent
set.
Theorem 1 LCCS (G,￿) ⊆ LCS (G,￿) and LCCS(G,￿) ⊆ LCS (G,￿).
Proof. It suﬃces to show that Zk ⊆ Y k for all k. We prove this by induction on k.F o r
k =0 , this is true since Z0 = Y 0.N o w , l e t Zk−1 ⊆ Y k−1 and let P ∈ Zk. Then it is
straightforward that P ∈ Y k.
In the example of Figure 2 we get as expected LCCS (G,￿)=LCCS (G,￿)=
{{1,2,3},{13,2}}. Unfortunately, the largest cautious consistent set LCCS(G,￿) or
LCCS (G,￿) might be empty in some situations. In general there is no relationship be-
tween LCCS (G,￿) andLCCS(G,￿). In the example of Figure 1, we have LCCS(G,￿)
= {{1,2,3},{1,23}} and LCCS(G,￿)={{12,3},{1,23}}. Nevertheless, we will show
that the largest cautious consistent set reﬁnes considerably the largest consistent set in
coalition formation games with positive spillovers (and that, both sets LCCS(G,￿) and
LCCS (G,￿) coincide).
The following example (see Figure 3) illustrates that the largest cautious consis-
tent set LCCS (G,￿) or LCCS(G,￿) might be empty, while the largest consistent set
LCS (G,￿) or LCS (G,￿) is not. Figure 3 depicts a three-player coalition formation
game in eﬀectiveness form. The payoﬀ vectors associated with the partitions are given
in Figure 3 as well as the possible moves from each partition. For instance, the coali-
tion of players 2 and 3 can move from {13,2} where they get respectively 1 to {1,23}
where they get 0.W e h a v e {123} < {12,3}, {1,2,3} < {13,2}, {1,23} < {12,3},
{123}￿{ 13,2}, but also {12,3}￿{ 13,2} and {13,2}￿{ 12,3}. It follows that
LCCS (G,￿)=LCCS (G,￿)=∅ but LCS (G,￿)=LCS (G,￿)={{12,3},{13,2}}.
Indeed, it is intuitively reasonable that no outcome can be possibly cautiously stable in
this example. Player 1 or the coalition formed by players 2 and 3 cannot end worse oﬀ by
engaging a move from {12,3} and {13,2}, respectively.
One condition on the game G in eﬀectiveness form which guarantees that the largest
cautious consistent set is nonempty is that the coalition formation game in eﬀectiveness
form is acyclic.
Deﬁnition 7 A coalition formation game in eﬀectiveness form G is acyclic if the eﬀec-
























F￿￿￿￿￿ 3. The largest cautious consistent set might be empty.
(where P0 = P and Pm = P) and a sequence S0,S 1,...,S m−1 such that Pj →Sj Pj+1,f o r
j =0 ,1,..,m− 1.
Theorem 2 If the coalition formation game in eﬀectiveness form G is acyclic, then the
sets LCCS(G,￿) and LCCS (G,￿) are nonempty.
Proof. Since P is ﬁnite and G is acyclic, there exists P ∈ P such that there does not exist
P￿ ∈ P and S ⊆ N such that P →S P￿. In other words P is an end coalition structure
from which no move is possible. Hence, P belongs to LCCS(G,￿) and LCCS(G,￿).
The acyclic property is a suﬃcient but not necessary condition that guarantees the
nonemptiness of the largest cautious consistent set. Indeed, the coalition formation games
with positive spillovers analyzed next are cyclic games for which the largest cautious
consistent set is nonempty.
3 Coalition Formation with Positive Spillovers
3.1 Conditions on the Payoﬀs
Gains are assumed to be positive, Vi(P) > 0 for all i ∈ N, for all P ∈ P. We consider
|N| > 2. We assume symmetric or identical players and equal sharing of the coalition gains
among coalition members.4 That is, in any coalition Si belonging to P, Vj (P)=Vl (P)
for all j,l ∈ Si, i =1 ,...,m.S o , l e t V (Si,P) denote the payoﬀ obtained by any player
belonging to Si in the coalition structure P. We focus on coalition formation games
satisfying the following conditions on the per-member payoﬀs.
4Ray and Vohra (1999) have provided a justiﬁcation for the assumption of equal sharing rule. In an
inﬁnite-horizon model of coalition formation among symmetric players with endogenous bargaining, they
have shown that in any equilibrium without delay there is equal sharing. See also Bloch (1996).
10(P.1) Positive Spillovers. V (Si,P\{S1,S 2}∪{S1 ∪ S2}) >V(Si,P) for all players be-
longing to Si, Si ￿= S1,S 2.
Condition (P.1) restricts our analysis to games with positive spillovers, where the
formation of a coalition by other players increases the payoﬀ of a player.
(P.2) Negative Association. V (Si,P) <V(Sj,P) if and only if |Si| > |Sj|.
Condition (P.2) imposes that, in any coalition structure, small coalitions have higher
per-member payoﬀs than big coalitions.
(P.3) Individual Free-Riding. V ({j},P\{Si}∪{ Si \{ j},{j}}) >V(Si,P) for all j ∈ Si,
Si ∈ P.
Condition (P.3) is related to the existence of individual free-riding incentives. That is,
if a player leaves any coalition to be alone, then he is better oﬀ.




Finally, condition (P.4) assumes that the grand coalition is the only eﬃcient coalition
structure with respect to payoﬀs, where V (N) denotes the payoﬀ of any player belonging
to the grand coalition {N}.
An economic situation satisfying these four conditions is a cartel formation game with
Cournot competition as in Bloch (1997) and Yi (1997). Let p(q)=a − q be the inverse
demand (q is the industry output). The industry consists of |N| identical ﬁrms. Inside
each cartel, we assume equal sharing of the beneﬁts obtained from the cartel’s production.
Once stable agreements on cartel formation have been reached, we observe a Cournot
competition among the cartels. The payoﬀ for each ﬁrm in each possible coalition structure
is well deﬁned. Firm i’s cost function is given by d · qi,w h e r eqi is ﬁrm i’s output and d
(a>d ) is the common constant marginal cost. As a result, the per-member payoﬀ in a






where |P| is the number of cartels within P.
Lemma 1 Output cartels in a Cournot oligopoly with the inverse demand function p(q)=
a −q and the cost function d(qi)=d ·qi satisfy (P.1)-(P.4).
11Yi (1997) asserted that conditions (P.1) and (P.2) are satisﬁed. It is straightforward
to show that (P.3) and (P.4) are also satisﬁed.
A second economic application of games with positive spillovers are economies with
pure public goods. The model we study is inspired from Bloch (1997), Yi (1997) and Ray
and Vohra (2001) wherein we introduce congestion. The economy consists of |N| agents.
At cost di(qi), agent i can provide qi units of the public good. Let q =
￿
i qi be the
total amount of public good. The utility each agent obtains from the public good depends
positively on the total amount of public good provided, but negatively on the number of
coalition partners: Ui(q)=( |S|)−α · q for all i ∈ S, where parameter α>0 measures
the degree of congestion. Each agent owns a technology to produce the public good,
and the cost of producing the amount qi of the public good is given by di(qi)=1
2(qi)2.
Since individual cost functions are convex and exhibit decreasing returns to scale, it is
cheaper to produce an amount q of public goods using all technologies than using a single
technology. In stage one the coalition formation takes place. Inside each coalition, we
assume equal sharing of the production. Once a coalition structure has been formed, each
coalition of agents acts noncooperatively. On the contrary, inside every coalition, agents
act cooperatively and the level of public good is chosen to maximize the sum of utilities of
the coalition members. That is, for any coalition structure P = {S1,S 2,...,S m}, the level






















yielding a total level of public good provision for the coalition Si equal to qSi =( |Si|)
2−α,











for all agents belonging to Si, i =1 ,...,m.
Contrary to the cartel formation game with Cournot competition, it depends on the
number of agents |N| and the degree of congestion α whether public goods coalitions
satisfy conditions (P1)-(P4). For instance, public goods coalitions with utility function
Ui (q)=( |S|)
−.15 · q for all i ∈ S and cost function di(qi)=1
2 (qi)
2 satisfy (P.1)-(P.4) if
|N|∈[4,6]. Notice that, for |N| < 4 the condition (P.3) is violated, while for |N| > 6 it
is (P.4) which is violated.
123.2 The Eﬀectiveness Relation
Remember that what coalitions can do if and when they form is speciﬁed by {→S}S⊆N,S￿=∅,
where {→S}, S ⊆ N,i sa neﬀectiveness relation on P. Restrictions are imposed on the
coalition formation process through the eﬀectiveness relation {→S} in G; P →S P￿ if and
only if (i) {Si \ (Si ∩S):Si ∈ P} = {S￿
i ∈ P￿ : S￿






j = S. Condition (i) simply means that no simultaneous deviations are
possible. If the players in S deviate leaving their coalition(s) in P, the non-deviating
players do not move. Nevertheless, once S has moved, the players not in S can react to
the deviation of S. Condition (ii) simply allows the deviating players in S to form one or
several coalitions in the new status-quo P￿. Non-deviating players do not belong to those
new coalitions.
3.3 Stable Coalition Structures
Before stating the results, we introduce some deﬁnitions or notations. A coalition structure
P is symmetric if and only if |Si| = |Sj| for all Si,S j ∈ P. We denote by P∗ = {N} the
grand coalition andby P the stand-alone coalition structure: P = {S1,...,S n} with |Si| =1
for all Si ∈ P (P∗ and P are symmetric coalition structures).
The following two lemmas partially characterize the largest consistent set for the coali-
tion formation game in eﬀectiveness form G under conditions (P.1)-(P.4). Lemma 2 states
that any coalition structure, wherein some coalition members would receive less than in
the stand-alone coalition structure, is never stable.
Lemma 2 Under (P.1)-(P.4), if there exists S ∈ P such that V (S,P) <V(S￿,P),t h e n
P/ ∈ LCS (G,￿) and P/ ∈ LCS (G,￿).
Proof. Condition (P.2) implies that in any coalition structure P, V (Si,P) <V(Sj,P) if
and only if |Si| > |Sj|. To prove Lemma 2, we proceed by steps.
Step one. Firstly, we show that all coalition structures P ∈ P containing only one
coalition S with |S| > 1 and V(S,P) <V (S￿,P), do not belong to LCS (G,￿) and
LCS (G,￿). Obviously, P<P and the deviation P →S P cannot be deterred. Indeed,
any deviation from P of players that did not belong to S in P will improve, by (P.1), the
payoﬀ of players that were in S (in P) and are singletons in P. Therefore, P/ ∈ LCS (G,￿)
and P/ ∈ LCS (G,￿).
Step two. Secondly, we show that all coalition structures P ∈ P containing only
two coalitions S1,S 2 with |S1|≥| S2| > 1 and V(S1,P) <V (S￿,P), do not belong to
LCS (G,￿) and LCS (G,￿). Condition (P.1) implies that the coalition S1 has incentives
13to split into singletons. Indeed, V ({j},P￿) >V (S￿,P) ∀j ∈ S1 and P<P ￿ where
P￿ = P \ S1 ∪{j}j∈S1. The deviation P →S1 P￿ cannot be deterred. Indeed,
-i fV (S2,P￿) <V (S￿,P), then using the argumentation of step one, the deviation
P￿ →S2 P is not deterred and P ￿ P. Therefore, P/ ∈ LCS (G,￿) and P/ ∈ LCS (G,￿).
-i fV (S2,P￿) >V(S￿,P), we have to show that any deviation from P￿ of players in
N\S1 will never make players in S1 worse oﬀ than in P. Two kinds of deviations are
possible. First, the players in S2 form a bigger coalition with players not in S1. Then,
by condition (P.1), the players in S1 that now are singletons obtain a payoﬀ even greater
than in P￿. Second, some player(s) leave(s) S2 to form singleton(s). Then, the players that
were in S1 are worse than in P￿ but, by (P.1), they are better oﬀ or at least not worse oﬀ
than in P,a n dV (S1,P) <V(S￿,P). Therefore, there is no other coalition structure P￿￿
such that P￿￿ ￿ P￿ and V ({j},P￿￿) <V(S1,P) for some j ∈ S1. Hence, P/ ∈ LCS (G,￿)
and P/ ∈ LCS (G,￿).
Step three. Thirdly, proceeding as above, we can show that all coalition structures
P ∈ P containing only three coalitions S1,S 2,S 3 with |S1|≥| S2|≥| S3| > 1 and
V(S1,P) <V(S￿,P), do not belong to LCS (G,￿) and LCS (G,￿). And so on.
The grand coalition structure which is the eﬃcient one always belongs to the largest
consistent set, and is possibly stable.
Lemma 3 Under (P.1)-(P.4), P∗ ∈ LCS (G,￿) and P∗ ∈ LCS (G,￿).
Proof. To prove that P∗ ∈ Y k (k ≥ 1) we have to show that for all P ￿= P∗ we have P
￿ P∗. That is, we show that P∗ could be stable since any deviation P∗ →S P can be
deterred by the threat of ending in P∗.T h ep r o o fi sd o n ei nt w os t e p s .
Step A. By (P.2) and (P.4) the players belonging to the biggest coalition (in size) in
any P ￿= P∗ are worse than in P∗. Also, all players prefer P∗ to P,a n dP∗ > P.
Step B. Take the sequence of moves where at each move one player belonging to the
biggest coalition (in the current coalition structure) deviates to form a singleton, until the
coalition structure P is reached. From P occurs the deviation P →N P∗.
Therefore, (A)-(B) imply that P∗ ￿ P for all P ￿= P∗.
From these two lemmas, we obtain a suﬃcient condition such that the largest consistent
set singles out the grand coalition.
Proposition 1 Under (P.1)-(P.4), if each non-symmetric coalition structure P ∈ P is
such that there exists S ∈ P satisfying V(S,P) <V(S￿,P),t h e nLCS (G,￿)={P∗} and
LCS (G,￿)={P∗}.
14Proof. Lemma 2 tells us that coalition structures P ∈ P, where ∃ S ∈ P such that
V(S,P) <V(S￿,P), do not belong to LCS (G,￿) and LCS (G,￿).S o , Y 1 ⊆ P\{P ∈
P : ∃S ∈ P for which V (S,P) <V (S￿,P)}. The conditions (P.2) and (P.4) imply
that all symmetric coalition structures P(￿= P∗) are such that V(Si,P)=V (Sj,P) and
V (N) >V(Si,P) for all Si,S j ∈ P (it implies that P∗ >Pfor all P(￿= P∗) symmetric).
So, the deviation P →N P∗ (where P symmetric) cannot be deterred since ￿P￿ such that
P￿ ￿ P∗ and P￿ ∈ Y 1. Therefore, LCS (G,￿)=LCS (G,￿)={P∗}.
We now show that the stand-alone coalition structure, i.e. the coalition structure
consisting only of singletons, is never stable under the largest consistent set based on the
indirect weak dominance relation.
Proposition 2 Under (P.1)-(P.4), P/ ∈ LCS (G,￿).
Proof. From Deﬁnition 4 and Lemma 2, we have that Y 0 ≡ P and Y 1 = {P ∈ P : ∀P￿,S
such that P →S P￿, ∃P￿￿ ∈ Y 0, where P￿ = P￿￿ or P￿ ￿ P￿￿,w ed on o th a v eVi(·,P) ≤
Vi(·,P￿￿) for all i ∈ S and Vi(·,P) <V i(·,P￿￿) for some i ∈ S}⊆P\{P ∈ P : ∃ S ∈ P for
which V(S,P) <V(S￿,P)}. Next we show that P/ ∈ Y 2 = {P ∈ Y 1 : ∀P￿,S such that
P →S P￿, ∃P￿￿ ∈ Y 1, where P￿ = P￿￿ or P￿ ￿ P￿￿,w ed on o th a v eVi(·,P) ≤ Vi(·,P￿￿) for
all i ∈ S and Vi(·,P) <V i(·,P￿￿) for some i ∈ S}. Any coalition structure P ∈ Y 1 is such
that ∀S ∈ P: V (S,P) ≥ V (S￿,P). By (P.2) and (P.4), the coalition structure P∗ = {N}
is eﬃcient and V(N) >V(S￿,P) for all i ∈ N. Therefore, P/ ∈ Y 2 because the deviation
P →N P∗ cannot be deterred. Indeed, for all P￿￿ ∈ Y 1, where P∗ = P￿￿ or P∗ ￿ P￿￿,w e
have Vi(·,P) ≤ Vi(·,P￿￿) for all i ∈ N and Vi(·,P) <V i(·,P￿￿) for some i ∈ N, by (P.1).
However, this results does not hold when we consider the deﬁnition of the largest
consistent set based on the indirect strict dominance relation. The stand-alone coalition
structure, P,m a yb e l o n gt oLCS(G,￿).







Consider Example 1 with four players. Throughout all the examples, we make a slight
15abuse of notation. For instance, {3,1} should not be interpreted as a single coalition
structure but as the four coalition structures, composed by two coalitions of size 3 and
1, that can be formed by four players. Example 1 shows how the use of the indirect
strict or weak dominance matters. Firstly, we characterize LCS(G,￿). In the ﬁrst round
of the iterative procedure to compute LCS(G,￿), we eliminate the coalition structures
{2,1,1}, {2,2} and {1,1,1,1}. Indeed, the deviations {2,1,1}→{ 1,1,1,1}, {2,2}→{ 4}
and {1,1,1,1}→{ 4} are not deterred. In the second round, we cannot eliminate other
coalition structures since any possible deviations from {4} or {3,1} are deterred. For
instance, the deviation {3,1}→{ 2,1,1} by one of the player who obtains 4 as payoﬀ
is deterred since there exists a sequence of moves {2,1,1}→{ 1,1,1,1}→{ 4}→{ 3,1}
ending at {3,1} such that at each move the deviating players prefer the ending coalition
structure to the status-quo they face and the original deviating player is not better oﬀ
(he obtains still 4 as payoﬀ). Then, LCS(G,￿)={{4},{3,1}}. Secondly, we character-
ize LCS(G,￿). We can only eliminate the coalition structure {2,1,1}. The deviations
{1,1,1,1}→{ 4} and {2,2}→{ 4} are deterred by the move from {4} to {3,1}. Then,
LCS(G,￿)={{4},{3,1},{2,2},{1,1,1,1}}.
3.4 Cautiously Stable Coalition Structures
In most economic situations satisfying the conditions (P.1)-(P.4), many coalition structures
belong to the largest consistent set. Indeed, the largest consistent set aims to be a weak
concept which rules out with conﬁdence. On the contrary, the largest cautious consistent
set aims to be better at picking out. The largest cautious consistent set singles out the
grand coalition.
Proposition 3 Under (P.1)-(P.4), LCCS(G,￿)={P∗} and LCCS(G,￿)={P∗}.
Proof. From Deﬁnition 6 we have Z0 = P.
Step one. From Lemma 2 and Deﬁnition 6, it is straightforward that the set of coalition
structures {P ∈ P : ∃ S ∈ P such that V(S,P) <V (S￿,P)} does not belong to Z1.
On the contrary, we can see that P∗ ∈ Z1. Consider ﬁrst any possible deviation from
P∗ of any coalition S to any coalition structure P containing only coalitions S with
V(S,P) >V(S￿,P), and such that P>P ∗. By (P.2) and (P.4) the players belonging to
the biggest coalition (in size) in any P ∈ P\{P∗} are worse than in P∗.F r o m P, take
the sequence of moves where, at each move, one of the players of the biggest coalition
in size deviates to form a singleton, until we arrive to P. From P occurs the deviation
to some coalition structure P￿which is a permutation of players in P (that is, |P| = |P￿|
and ∀S ∈ P, there exists a coalition S￿ ∈ P￿ such that |S| = |S￿|), and such that the
16initial player who has deviated from P is occupying now in P￿ the position of some player
i belonging to the coalition S that, initially, has moved from P∗ to P. This means that
P￿ ￿ P and at least one of the initial deviating players of coalition S from P∗ (player i)
is worse oﬀ in P￿ compared to P∗. Therefore, every possible deviation from P∗ to some
coalition structure P with all S ∈ P such that V(S,P) >V(S￿,P), is deterred because
there always exists a coalition structure P￿, with P￿ ￿ P and such that V (·,P￿) <V(·,P∗)
for some player i ∈ S and P∗ →S P. Finally, we have to consider any possible deviation
of some coalition S from P∗ to P with P>P ∗ and such that for some S￿￿ ∈ P we have
V(S￿￿,P) <V(S￿,P). If such a deviation does exist, it will be deterred because P ￿ P
and all i ∈ N get a payoﬀ V (·,P) <V(·,P∗). Then, P∗ ∈ Z1,a n dZ1 ⊆ P\{P ∈ P :
∃ S ∈ P such that V (S,P) <V(S￿,P)}.
Step two. Take the coalition structure P or any other coalition structure P ∈ Z1 ⊆
P\{P ∈ P : ∃ S ∈ P such that V (S,P) <V(S￿,P)} containing some coalition S that
obtains a payoﬀ V(S,P)=V(S￿,P). Obviously, P or P does not belong to Z2 since
for all P￿,S such that P →S P￿ or P →S P￿, the expected payoﬀ obtained by assigning
positive probabilities to all coalition structures P￿￿ ∈ Z1,w i t hP￿ = P￿￿ or P￿ ￿ P￿￿,i s
strictly preferred to V (S,P) for all players in S, given that P∗ ￿ P￿ for all P￿ ∈ P and
V(·,P) <V(·,P∗). Using the same reasoning as in step one, one can show that P∗ ∈ Z2,
with Z2 ⊆ P\{{P}∪{ P ∈ P : ∃ S ∈ P such that V (S,P) ≤ V (S￿,P)}}.
Step three. Take the coalition structure(s) P ∈ Z2 containing the coalition S that
obtains the smallest payoﬀ. Obviously, P does not belong to Z3 since for all P￿,S such
that P →S P￿, the expected payoﬀ obtained by assigning positive probabilities to all
coalition structures P￿￿ ∈ Z2,w i t hP￿ = P￿￿ or P￿ ￿ P￿￿, is strictly preferred to V (S,P)
for all players in S, given that P∗ ￿ P￿ for all P￿ ∈ P,a n dV (S,P) <V(·,P∗) for all
i ∈ S (the deviating coalition). One can use the same reasoning used in step one to show
that P∗ ∈ Z3. And so on, until we have eliminated all P ∈ P\{P∗} (given that, by (P.2)
and (P.4), the players belonging to the biggest coalition (in size) in any P ∈ P\{P∗} are
worse than in P∗).
Now, consider P∗. From Lemma 3, we know that for all P ￿= P∗, P ￿ P∗. Then,
LCCS (G,￿)={P∗} and LCCS (G,￿)={P∗}, since for all P￿,S such that P∗ →S P￿,
the expected payoﬀ obtained by assigning positive probability to P∗ (the only coali-
tion structure not yet eliminated in the iterative procedure described above) and with
P￿ ￿ P∗, is equally preferred to the payoﬀ obtained in P∗ for all i ∈ S (the initial devi-
ating coalition)
17This result is due to the basic idea behind the largest cautious consistent set. Intu-
itively, at each iteration in the deﬁnition of the largest cautious consistent set, we rule out
the coalition structure wherein some players receive less or equal than what they could
obtain in all candidates to be stable (i.e. all coalition structures not ruled out yet) since
these players cannot end worse oﬀ by engaging a move.







In the ﬁrst round of the iterative procedure to compute the largest consistent set,
we eliminate the coalition structures {1,1,1,1} and {2,1,1}. Indeed, the deviations
{1,1,1,1}→{ 4} and {2,1,1}→{ 1,1,1,1} are not deterred. In the second round,
we cannot eliminate other coalition structures since any possible deviations from {4} or
{3,1} or {2,2} are deterred. For example, the deviation {3,1}→{ 2,1,1} by one of
the player who obtains 4.08 as payoﬀ is deterred since there exists a sequence of moves
{2,1,1}→{ 4}→{ 3,1} ending at {3,1} such that at each move the deviating players
prefer the ending coalition structure to the status-quo they face and the original deviating
player is not better oﬀ (he obtains still 4.08 as payoﬀ). Therefore, the largest consistent
set is LCS(G,￿)={{4},{3,1},{2,2}}.
But {3,1} and {2,2} do not belong to the largest cautious consistent set. Indeed, the
deviation {3,1}→{ 2,1,1} by one of the player who obtains 4.08 as payoﬀ is not deterred
since all coalition structures that indirectly dominate {2,1,1} and not yet eliminated
are {4}, {3,1} and {2,2}. Hence, the expected payoﬀ of the original deviating player,
obtained by assigning positive probabilities to {4}, {3,1} and {2,2}, is greater than 4.08.
Once {3,1} is eliminated, the deviation {2,2}→{ 4} is not deterred. Therefore, {3,1}
and {2,2} do not belong to the largest cautious consistent set which singles out {4}.
4 Cartel Formation with Quantity Competition
In the cartel formation game with Cournot competition, the largest consistent set based on
the indirect weak dominance relation singles out for |N|≤4 the grand coalition P∗ = {N}.
But as |N| grows, many coalition structures may belong to LCS(G,￿).













In the ﬁrst round of the iterative procedure to compute the largest consistent set,
we eliminate the coalition structures {2,1,1,1,1}, {3,1,1,1}, {4,1,1}. The deviations
{2,1,1,1,1}→{ 1,1,1,1,1,1}, {3,1,1,1}→{ 1,1,1,1,1,1}, {4,1,1}→{ 1,1,1,1,1,1} are
not deterred. Also, we can eliminate {2,2,1,1}: the deviation {2,2,1,1}→{ 2,1,1,1,1}
is not deterred. In the second round, we delete the coalition structure {1,1,1,1,1,1}:t h e
deviation {1,1,1,1,1,1}→{ 3,3} is not deterred. No more coalition structures can be
eliminated at the next rounds. For example, the deviation from {2,2,2} to {6} is deterred
by the further deviation to {5,1}. Therefore, {{6}, {5,1}, {4,2}, {3,3}, {3,2,1}, {2,2,2}}
is the largest consistent set LCS(G,￿). The sum of the payoﬀs associated to coalition
structures {6}, {5,1}, {2,2,2} are .2502, .222, .1872, respectively.
We now turn to the characterization of the largest consistent set for |N|≤10.
Proposition 4 In the cartel formation game under Cournot competition, LCS(G,￿)=
{P∗} for |N|≤4,a n dLCS(G,￿)=P \{ { P}∪{ P ∈ P : ∃S ∈ P such that V(S,P) <
V(S￿,P)}} for 5 ≤| N|≤10.
The proof of this proposition can be found in the appendix. Some remarks can be
made. Firstly, P∗ always belongs to the largest consistent set LCS(G,￿) (see Lemma
3), while P never belongs to LCS(G,￿) (see Proposition 2). Secondly, for 10 ≥| N|≥5,
all symmetric coalition structures, except P, belong to LCS(G,￿). Finally, all non-
symmetric coalition structures P such that ￿ S ∈ P with V (S,P) <V(S￿,P) belong to
19LCS(G,￿).
We compare now the outcomes obtained under the largest consistent set (and the
largest cautious consistent set) with those obtained under a sequential game of coalition
formation with ﬁxed payoﬀ division proposed by Bloch (1996). A ﬁxed protocol is assumed
and the sequential game proceeds as follows. Player 1 proposes the formation of a coalition
S1 to which he belongs. Each prospective player answers the proposal in the order ﬁxed
by the protocol. If one prospective player rejects the proposal, then he makes a counter-
proposal to which he belongs. If all prospective players accept, then the coalition S1 is
formed. All players in S1 withdraw from the game, and the game proceeds among the
players belonging to N \S1. This sequential game has an inﬁnite horizon, but the players
do not discount the future. The players who do not reach an agreement in ﬁnite time
receive a payoﬀ of zero. Contrary to the largest consistent set, this sequential game relies
on the commitment assumption. Once some players have agreed to form a coalition they
are committed to remain in that coalition.
Consider the following ﬁnite procedure to form coalitions. First, player 1 starts the
game and chooses an integer s1 in the interval [1,|N|]. Second, player s1+1chooses an in-
teger s2 in [1,|N|−s1]. Third, player s1+s2+1chooses an integer s3 in [1,|N|−s1 −s2].
The game goes on until the sequence (s1,s 2,s 3,...) satisﬁes
￿
j sj = |N|. For symmetric
valuations, if the ﬁnite procedure yields as subgame perfect equilibrium a coalition struc-
ture with the property that payoﬀs are decreasing in the order in which coalitions are
formed, then this coalition structure is supported by the (generically) unique symmetric
stationary perfect equilibrium (SSPE) of the sequential game (see Bloch, 1996). This
result makes easy the characterization of the SSPE outcome of the cartel formation game.
Lemma 4 (Bloch, 1996) In Bloch’s sequential coalition formation game under Cournot
competition, any symmetric stationary perfect equilibria (SSPE) is characterized by P =
{S∗,{i}i/ ∈S∗} where |S∗| is the ﬁrst integer following (2n +3− y)1
2,w h e r ey =
√
4n+5 .
If y is an integer, |S∗| can take on the two values (2n +3−y)1
2 and (2n +5− y)1
2.
Intuitively, in the sequential game, ﬁrms commit to stay out of the cartel until the
number of remaining ﬁrms equals the minimal proﬁtable cartel size (this is the smallest
coalition size for which a coalition member obtains a higher payoﬀ than if all coalitions
are singletons, and is equal to |S∗|). From Proposition 4 and Lemma 4, the relationship
between the largest consistent set LCS(G,￿) and SSPE follows straightforwardly.
Proposition 5 In the cartel formation game under Cournot competition with |N|≤10,
the coalition structures supported by any symmetric stationary perfect equilibria (SSPE)
of Bloch’s sequential game always belong to the largest consistent set LCS(G,￿).
20Assume now that each player belonging to a coalition S have to support a monitoring
or congestion cost c(S) which is increasing with the coalition size and has the following
functional form.5 For all S ⊆ N, c(S)=c·(|S − 1|)
φ for |S| > 1 and c(S)=0for |S| =1 ,
with c,φ > 0.F o rc =0 , the monitoring is said to be costless. For c>0, the monitoring
is said to be costly. As a result, the per-member expected payoﬀ in a cartel of size |S|





2 −c · (|S −1|)
φ . (3)
It should be noted that, once a monitoring cost is introduced, the valuation still satisﬁes
the properties of positive spillovers, negative association and individual free-riding. How-
ever, the grand coalition may be ineﬃcient. Example 4 illustrates that a monitoring cost
may reﬁne the largest consistent set and single out the grand coalition.













Applying the iterative procedure to Example 4, we obtain that the largest consistent
set LCS(G,￿) is {{6}}. The sum of the payoﬀs associated to coalition structure {6} is
.192. We observe that the sum of the payoﬀs is greater than the one associated to some
stable coalition structures when monitoring is costless (see Example 3).
In Table 1, we report the coalition structures supported by diﬀerent solution concepts
in the cartel formation game with six ﬁrms: SSPE of Bloch’s sequential game, LCS(G,￿),
LCCS(G,￿), open membership, game ∆,g a m eΓ, α stability, β stability, and equilibrium
5Monitoring or congestion costs may emerge because larger coalitions face higher organizational costs,
or moral hazard problems as in Espinosa and Macho-Stadler (2002)’s study of cartel formation in a Cournot
oligopoly with teams.
21binding agreements.6 It is shown that, among the concepts or coalition formation games
considered, the largest cautious consistent set is the only one to single out the grand
coalition. Moreover, this observation holds whatever the number of ﬁrms |N|,s e eT a b l e
10.1 in Bloch (1997) and our Proposition 3.7
Concept : Stable coalition structures :







Open membership, Game ∆ {{1,1,1,1,1,1}}
Game Γ, α stability, β stability {{6},{5,1}}
Equilibrium binding agreements {6} is not an EBA
Table 1: Stable coalition structures in the cartel formation game with six ﬁrms.
5 Conclusion
We have adopted the largest consistent set due to Chwe (1994) to predict which coalition
structures are possibly stable in coalition formation games with positive spillovers. We
have also introduced a reﬁnement, the largest cautious consistent set. For games satisfying
the properties of positive spillovers, negative association, individual free-riding incentives
and eﬃciency of the grand coalition, many coalition structures may belong to the largest
consistent set. The grand coalition, which is the eﬃcient coalition structure, always be-
longs to the largest consistent set and is the unique one to belong to the largest cautious
consistent set.
6See Bloch (1997) for a description of theses concepts or coalition formation games. The open member-
ship game was suggested by Yi (1997) and Yi and Shin (2000). The game ∆ and the game Γ are exclusive
membership games proposed by Hart and Kurz (1983). The α stability concept and the β stability concept
are cooperative concepts of stability which have been proposed for games with spillovers by Hart and Kurz
(1983). Finally, Ray and Vohra (1997) have proposed a solution concept, the equilibrium binding agree-
ments (EBA), which rules out coalitional deviations which are not themselves immune to further deviations
by subcoalitions. Table 10.1 in Bloch (1997) summarizes the outcomes or stable coalition structures in the
cartel formation game with |N| ﬁrms.
7There are no relationships between Ray and Vohra’s (1997) EBA concept and LCS(G,￿) or
LCCS(G,￿). EBAs exhibit a cyclical pattern, whereby the grand coalition is sometimes a stable coalition
structure, sometimes not, depending on |N|.
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A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 4.
Part 1: |N|≤4. Simple computations show that each non-symmetric coalition struc-
ture P ∈ P is such that there exists S ∈ P with V (S,P) <V(S￿,P). From Proposition 1,
we have LCS(G,￿)={P∗} for |N|≤4.
Part 2: 5 ≤| N|≤10. From Lemmas 2 and 3 and Proposition 2, we have {P ∈ P : ∃S ∈
P such that V (S,P) <V(S
￿
,P)} / ∈ LCS(G,￿), P/ ∈ LCS(G,￿) and P∗ ∈ LCS(G,￿),
respectively.
To prove that {P ∈ P : P ￿= P,P∗ and V(S,P) ≥ V(S
￿
,P) for all S ∈ P}⊂
LCS(G,￿), we have to show that all possible deviations from P can be deterred. Two
kinds of possible deviations that beneﬁt the deviating players have to be considered.
Firstly, we consider the splitting deviations P →S P￿ such that |P￿| > |P|.T h e
condition (P.1) implies that the players in N\S are worse oﬀ in P￿. Then, conditions (P.1)
and (P.3) imply that further splitting deviations of players in N\S can occur and lead to
some P￿￿ where P￿￿ →N P and V(·,P￿￿) <V(·,P) for all i ∈ N. Therefore, P￿ ￿ P and
the deviation P →S P￿ is deterred.
Secondly, we consider the enlarging deviations P →S P￿ such that |P￿| < |P| and
V(S,P￿) >V(·,P) for all i ∈ S. Then, P￿ >P . Notice that by (P.1)-(P.4) and the
payoﬀ structure in the cartel formation game (Expression 1) we have P￿ >Pif and only
if |P￿| < |P| and both coalition structures P and P￿ are symmetric. Then, the coalition S
which moves from P to P￿ is S = N. Two cases should be distinguished:
(i) P￿ = P∗. Take the deviation P∗ →{i} P￿￿ where player i deviates to form a
singleton with P￿￿ >P ￿. It can be shown that V (·,P￿￿) <V(·,P) for some i ∈ S = N (the
initial deviating coalition) and V (·,P￿￿) ≥ V(S￿,P) for all S￿￿ ∈ P￿￿. Then, the deviation






(|N| +1 ) 2 = V (S￿,P) iﬀ (|N|)2 − 7(|N|)+1 0≥ 0,
condition which is satisﬁed for 5 ≤| N|≤10. Moreover, we have to show that V (S￿￿,P￿￿) <
V(·,P) for some i ∈ S = N (the initial deviating coalition). Since P is symmetric, we
have to compare V (S￿￿,P￿￿) with the payoﬀ obtained in the symmetric coalition structures.
24Given that 5 ≤| N|≤10 the only symmetric coalition structures we could have are such


























































and all these conditions are satisﬁed for 5 ≤| N|≤10. Hence, the deviation P →N P∗ is
deterred (with P symmetric).
(ii)P￿ ￿= P∗(i.e. all players deviate from P to another symmetric coalition structure P￿,
with P￿ ￿= P∗). From P￿ ap l a y e ri deviates to form a singleton. That is, P￿ →{i} P￿￿. From
P￿￿, take the sequence of moves where, at each move, one of the players belonging to the
biggest coalition in size, deviates to form a singleton until we arrive to P. From P occurs
the deviation of coalition N \{ i} to the coalition structure P￿￿￿ with P￿￿￿ = {N \{ i},{i}}
and such that P￿￿￿ ￿ P￿ given that player i (who deviated from P￿) is now alone in
P￿￿￿ and V ({i},P￿￿￿) >V(·,P￿) by (P.1) and (P.2). As before, it is immediate to see that
V({N\{i}},P￿￿￿) <V(·,P) for some player i ∈ N (the initial deviating coalition) whenever
P is symmetric. So, the deviation P →N P￿ (with P and P￿ symmetric) is deterred.
Therefore, the enlarging deviations P →S P￿ are deterred.
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